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Abstract
Network formation within the BRITE-EURAM program is investigated. We de-
scribe the role of the hub of the network, which is defined as the set of main con-
tractors that account for most of the participations. We study the effects that the
conflict of objectives within European research funding between pre–competitive
research vs. European cohesion has on the formation of networks and on the rela-
tionship between different partners of the network.
A panel data set is constructed including the second and third framework of the
Brite–Euram program. A model of joint production of research results is used to
test for changes in the behavior of partners within the two frameworks.
The main findings are that participations are very concentrated, that is a small
group of institutions account for most of the participations, but going from the sec-
ond to the third framework the presence of subcontractors and single participants
increases substantially. This result is reinforced by the fact that main contractors
receive smaller spill-ins within networks, but spill-ins increase from the second to
the third framework.
JEL Subject Classification: Positive Analysis of Policy–Making and Imple-
mentation (D78), National Government Expenditures and Related Policies: Gen-
eral (H50), O32 (Management of Technological Innovation and R& D) and O38
(Governent Policy).
1 Introduction
The European Commission (EC) has been pursuing an active policy of funding re-
search since its inception. The EC R& D projects intend to have strategic character,
i.e. they are aimed at changing the objectives and methods of research, rather than
simply augmenting the search for new knowledge. On the one hand the EC has the
objective of improving the competitivity of the European industry by the invention
and development of new processes and products, and on the other hand it wants to
trigger projects that would not be initiated without this funding. Another goal is
to promote links between academic and industrial research. These objectives have
to be balanced out with the goal of European cohesion, trying to expand research
capabilities to institutions from underdeveloped regions.
This wide and diverse set of objectives is not always internally coherent. Es-
pecially conflicting are the attempts to foster pre-competitive research and being
at the same time market oriented, as it is often the case for industry–oriented R &
D research programs. In some of these programs the funding effort is supposed to
contribute to the process of European cohesion, but at the same time the projects
must be selected on technical and scientific merit alone. Another typical conflict
arises from the fact that picking a mix of institutions with different research ca-
pabilities contributes to the diffusion of new techniques and results and therefore
improves the research capabilities of the European scientific community taken as a
whole, while funding the most reputed institutions allows the programs to present
a high research productivity in the short run.
These conflicts can be studied by means of a simple framework. The funding
agency, in this case the EC, demands scientific results and supplies funds for re-
search, while the research units demand funds and supply results. We do not have
information about scientific results, but we have very detailed information on the
funding effort by the European Commission and about the participation of research
units in the Brite–Euram program.
In this paper we study the effects of the funding effort by the European Com-
mission on both the supply and the demand of funds, and on the participation of
research units in the networks formed. We study the contracts signed under the
Brite Euram program for the second and third framework. Particular attention is
given to the hub of the network, that is main contractors or originators of networks
that span different networks and different years, accounting for a substantial pro-
portion of the total participation in networks. We use a model of coalition forma-
tion and spill–ins within the coalition (see Olson and Zeckhauser, 1966, or Sandler
and Murdoch, 1990) to formulate an empirical model and analyze the effects of EC
funding on the networks, by assessing how the role of the hub and the evolution of
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the networks have changed along the two frameworks.
The paper is organized as follows: In section 2 we present a theoretical model
of network interaction. We proceed in section 3 by describing the main features of
the Brite/Euram program. This allows us to identify some dynamic features of the
contracts signed, which we present in section 4. The theoretical model is finally
implemented empirically and tested in section 5. We conclude in section 6.
2 A model of research coalitions
We start by proposing a model of network interaction, based on similar models that
have been proposed in the literature for the production of joint public goods 1.
We consider the networks as coalitions of researchers which engage in research
activities that provide both private knowledge output, which is institution–specific,
and public knowledge output, which is network–specific.
Let qi be the private knowledge and ki the public knowledge produced by mem-
ber i of a network, and li the general research activities provided by the i–th com-
ponent of the network. The joint production relationships for qi and ki are given
by:
qi D fi.li /;(1)
and
ki D gi.li /;(2)
where both fi./ and gi./ are assumed to be twice continously differentiable and
concave.
Consider the total public knowledge produced within the network, K. Since K
is a purely public good within the network, each partner receives the knowledge
that he/she produces, ki, and the common knowledge spilled in from the rest of the
network, QKi DP j6Di ki. Hence, each partner receives:
K D QKi C ki:
If the network has n members, the knowledge that spills over to participant i
1For a survey of this kind of models see Sandler (1992), chapters 4 and 5. The version that we
present here follows closely Sandler and Murdoch (1990).
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derives from the aggregate activities QLi of the n− 1 partners according to the fol-
lowing relation:
QKi D s. QLi /; s0 > 0; s00 < 0:(3)
We model the choice of network activity by the utility function of a represen-
tative member of the network (network members do not need to be identical):
ui D ui.xi;qi; QKi C ki /;(4)
where xi represents the nummeraire, or the choice of other goods (income effects
are assumed to be negligible).
Substituting equations (1), (2) and (3) into (4), we obtain:
ui D ui.xi; fi.li /;gi .li /C s. QLi //D vi.xi; lij QLi /:
There are two ways of obtaining demand functions from this model: 1) the
Nash–Cournot equilibrium concept implies that each agent chooses the level of
activity in order to maximize his or her utility subject to an income budget con-
straint and to the prevailing contributions of public knowledge from the rest of the
network, QLi DP j6Di l j and 2) the Lindahl equilibrium concept, that assumes that
network members communicate and exchange information concerning the level
of the public knowledge that they are going to share in the network, but meet the
costs by individualized cost shares (the shares must sum to one, so that costs are
covered).
The maximization problem for the i-th agent in the case of Nash–Cournot equi-
librium can be written as:
max
xi;Li
fvi .xi; li j QLi/jIi C p QLi D pxxi C plig;
where px and p are the prices of x and L respectively, and Ii C p QLi is income.
The solution to this maximization problem is the demand function for total net-
work research activity by institution i:
liN D liN .Ii C pli; py; p; Qli /:(5)
where the subscript N stands for Nash-Cournot. The network demand for com-
mon knowledge depends on prices, income and the level of knowledge spill-ins.
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In equilibrium all members of the network will demand the equilibrium level of
total network research activity, that is le D liN for all i.
For a research coalition, we can also take into account that the search for sci-
entific results can be considered a race against other research teams, and therefore
the research expenditure of other similar networks can be considered as a “threat”,
T , for any given coalition of researchers. If we condition all the analysis to this
threat, we will find this new variable in the demand function:
liN D liN .Ii C pli; py; p; Qli ;T /:(6)
In the case of Lindahl equilibrium concept, each partner in the network is as-
sumed to have preferences represented by the following utility function:
ui D ui.xi;qi;K/;(7)
where again
K D QKi C ki(8)
and the joint production relationships are
qi D fi.L/(9)
and
K D g.L/:(10)
In this case the total level of the collective research activity, k, produces both
the private and public knowledge experienced by each partner of the network. The
Lindahl equilibrium concepts implies a cooperative game, and therefore the part-
ners choose the equilibrium level of joint research. Each partner contributes a pri-
vate effort to the relationship and is assigned a share in the aggregate cost of the
project, i.
Substituting (8), (9) and (10) into (7) and taking into account the budget con-
straint:
pxxi C i pL D Ii
allows us to formulate the maximization problem for the i-th partner as follows:
max
xi;L
fUi .xi; L/jpx xi C i pL D Iig
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The solution to this problem gives the following demand functions:
LiH D LiH.Ii; py; i p;T /;(11)
where H stands for Lindahl.
We will base our estimable equations on equation (6) for the Nash-Cournot case
and equation (11) for the Lindahl case. We will assume that the total research ac-
tivity assumed by each network can be measured by the EC contribution, while the
total income that each participant has, is given by the total cost committed to the
project. We do not have information about knowledge prices, but assuming that
prices of the rest of goods and knowledge prices move together, and taking into
account the 0-degree homogeneity of the demand functions, we can formulate the
demand functions only in terms of income and spill-ins, by deflating all variables
by a common price deflator.
We will use this model to investigate the demand functions for EC contribution
of different types of participants at different moments in time. It is necessary first
to describe what are the relevant types of participants, and how participation has
evolved over Framework 2 and 3 of the Brite–Euram program.
3 The BRITE - EURAM shared-cost projects
The following analysis focuses on the contracts signed in the period 1989–1993
in the BRITE-EURAM I and BRITE-EURAM II (henceforth in general BE) pro-
grams 2. BE represents a particularly suitable program for our purpose for the fol-
lowing reasons. First, its technological and sectorial foci represents a heteroge-
neous set of participants (Commission, 1992b: p.41; Commission, 1993: p.10).
Second, the sectorial orientation involves not only applied and development work,
but also more basic research with industrial applicability. Third, if we consider
both the number of participations and the funding level for shared cost actions, BE
is the second most important program throughout this period.
We obtained the original data set from the DGXII of the EC. The contracts
signed were respectively 352, with 1783 participations3, in the Second Framework
(SF) and 703, with 2056 participations, in the Third Framework (TF). For each
2The contracts signed under RAW and AERONAUTICS are not included.
3In this part of the article for participation we mean a contractor of any category, including
also institutions involved in time/contribution amendments. In the statistics, instead, participations
come only from contractors involved in shared–cost actions.
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Table 1: Participations in the two frameworks, break down by type of cost
Cost Type 2nd. Framework 3rd. Framework Total
ECO 1,302 (73.2%) 1,221 (73.5%) 2,523 (73.3%)
MAR 476 (26.8%) 441 (26.5%) 916 (26.7%)
Total 1,778 1,662 3,440
Source: Elaboration EC Data
contract we were provided with the following information: title of the project, du-
ration of the contract, cost and EC contribution4, participants names and locations,
and participants position in the network (main contractor, secondary contractor,
subcontractor, etc.). Instead, we did not succeed in obtaining information on the
organizations: type of institution (large enterprise, small-medium enterprise, uni-
versity, research organization, etc.) and its dimension. As we were interested in
the research network, we decided to focus our analysis only on shared-cost col-
laborative research projects. Therefore, we excluded from our database the fol-
lowing types of contracts: feasibility award, first step CRAFT, concerted action,
other ’like-grant’ action, and time ammendments. Instead, we considered the in-
stitutions involved in contribution ammendments as normal contractors taking part
in the network. The database constructed in this way takes then into account about
90% of the contracts (of those involving shared-cost actions) signed during the
Second Framework Program, and 80% of the ones signed during the Third Frame-
work Program5.
As shown in Table 1 and 2 we have a population of 3,440 participations subdi-
vided in 673 contracts, with 350 contracts in the SF and 323 in the TF. The type of
cost, MAR or ECO, identifies the participants that receive up to 100% of the ad-
ditional cost (MAR, limited to High Education Institutions, HEIs), and the other
participants type, to whom the Community reimburses up to 50% of the project
costs (ECO).
When we look at the total population, HEIs with a bit more then one fourth of
the participations, are playing a quite relevant role both in the SF and in the TF. But,
when we look at main contractor figures not only their relevance is less evident, but
also their share is going down from the SF to the TF. Therefore, if we make the
4The community reimburses up to 50 % of the project costs to companies or institutes that
operate a project costing system. Universities, higher education establishments and similar non–
commercial bodies receive up to 100 % of the additional costs.
5The Third Framework will last up to the end of 1994, then the 80 % represents an estimate of
the contracts signed up to March 1st, 1994.
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Table 2: Main contractors participations, break down by type of cost
Cost Type 2nd. Framework 3rd. Framework Total
ECO 278 (79.4%) 263 (81.4%) 541 (80.4%)
MAR 72 (20.6%) 60 (18.6%) 132 (19.6%)
Total 350 323 673
Source: Elaboration EC Data
Table 3: EC contribution in the two frameworks, break down by type of cost (in
Million ECUs)
Cost Type 2nd. Framework 3rd. Framework Total
ECO 275 (73%) 293 (77%) 568 (74%)
MAR 101 (27%) 88 (23%) 189 (26%)
Total 377 380 757
Source: Elaboration EC Data
assumption that projects directed by a HEI are more focused on pre-competitive
research, we can highlight a strong and increasing market orientation for the pro-
gram. To reinforce this observation in Table 3 we show the data concerning the EC
contribution. While in the SF the share of EC contribution to HEIs and the share of
their participations are about the same value, in the TF they are different due to a
decrease in the EC contribution of about 4 points6. Therefore, in the TF, HEIs not
only have played a less important role in establishing the research efforts, with a
subordinate position as the main contractor, but they have also received less funds
from the EC, thus weakening furthermore their impact.
To understand the differences between BE I and BE II we develop a more de-
tailed analysis of the EC contribution. Firstly, we subdivide the variable EC con-
tribution in six categories:
(1) 0 - 25,000 ECU;
(2) 25,000 - 100,000 ECU;
6Comparing these figures with the ones of the total framework (see for example Commission,
1994b) we note that the BE programs are characterized by a lower level of HEI participations, and a
higher level of HEI funding. Therefore, compared to the aggregate figure, HEIs in the BE program
are strong players even if in relative terms they are loosing importance.
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Figure 1:
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(3) 100,000 - 200,000 ECU;
(4) 200,000 - 300,000 ECU;
(5) 300,000 - 500,000 ECU;
(6) > 500,000 ECU.
We classify the contracts (in this case one for each participation) in relation to
these classes. In Figure 1 we show the allocation of EC Total contribution.
Each bar represents the number of contracts present in that class. The distri-
bution is very similar in the two frameworks. The TF, as expected, has slightly
lower values than the SF. Only in the first and in the last category it has a higher
number of contracts. In particular, the increase of the first class is mainly due to
the relevant raise in the number of HEIs contracts.
As Figure 2 illustrates, going from the SF to the TF a larger number of HEIs
have participated in a contract with a contribution smaller than 25,000 ECU. While
8
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the first category is more than double, the fifth has lost about 30% of the partici-
pations.
On the other hand, (see Figure 3), enterprises and research centers have de-
creased their participation in low budget contract (class 2 has lost a relevant num-
ber of contracts) and they have increased their presence in the top class.
Therefore, the increase in the total number of participations with a contract of
the sixth category is only caused by this last dynamic feature. Therefore, we can
again reconfirm and definitely support the previous observation that HEIs have
played a decreasingly important role in the context of the BE programs.
As we highlighted previously, the share of participations and the quota of EC
contributions have about the same value in the SF and slightly different in the TF.
Although this difference is important for the understanding of a peculiar trend, it is
not crucial for the general analysis. Therefore, given the prior description, in our
opinion it is equivalent to study the participations or the funding.
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1 0 3 1 0 3
2 1 2
1 4 3
3 8 7
3 6 4
3 0 4
2 6 4
2 3 4
2 4 9
6 3
9 8
10
Table 4: Distribution of the participation type
Participation Type 2nd Framework 3rd Framework Total
100 350 – 19.7% 323 – 19.4% 673 – 19.5%
200 337 – 19.9% 312 – 18.8% 649 – 18.9%
300 305 – 17. 1% 296 – 17.8% 601 – 17.5%
400 258 – 15.5% 196 – 11.8% 454 – 13.2%
500 178 – 10.0% 135 – 8.1% 313 – 9.1%
Other Contractors 130 – 7.3% 142 – 8.5% 272 – 7.9 %
Sub Contractors 220 – 12.4% 258 – 15.6% 478 – 813.9%
TOTAL 1778 – 100% 1662 – 100% 3440 – 100%
Source: Elaboration EC data
4 Network formation and the hard hub
Up to now we have regarded participants as anonymous institutions without soul
and we have ignored completely the network dimension. In this section we try
to find a remedy to this shortcoming. Afterwards, we focus our analysis on the
formation of networks.
In Table 4 we show the participations distribution according to the position in
the network (100 = main contractor, 200 = second contractor, etc). We can high-
light two changes in the networks from the SF to the TF.
First, there has been an important increase in the number of subcontractors7.
Networks have become more branched in small components. Therefore, the num-
ber of network linkages with different priority level has increased. At the two ex-
tremes are the relationship among contractors at the international level on the one
hand, and the linkage between contractors and subcontractors at the local level on
the other hand, which was pre-existing to the RTD projects. The increase in sub-
contractors implies an increased probability of having networks composed by parts
of already pre-existing networks. Therefore, networks of the TF are characterized
by less genuine novelty.
Second, up to the third contractor there are no big differences between the two
frameworks. Instead, the share of participants identified as fourth contractor has
strongly decreased in the TF. Hence, in the last framework the networks are com-
7Each contractor is entitled to sub–contract part of his/her research to other institutions that be-
come his specific subcontractors
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Table 5: Network by number of partners
Number of Partnersa 2nd Framework 3rd Framework Total
1 7 – 2.0% 3 – 0.9% 10 – 1.5%
2 22 – 6.3% 7 – 2.2% 29 – 4.3%
3 44 – 12.6% 91 – 28.2% 135 – 20.1%
4 58 – 16.6% 52 – 16.1% 110 – 16.3%
5 94 – 26.9% 54 – 16.7% 148 – 22.0%
6 61 – 17.4% 42 – 13% 103 – 15.3%
> 6 64 – 18.3% 74 – 22.9% 138 – 20.5%
TOTAL 350 – 100% 323 – 100% 673 – 100%
Source: Elaboration EC data.
aThe number of partners is given by the sum of coordinators, contractors, sub–contractors and
contribution ammendments contractors.
posed by a smaller number of contractors. Typically in the TF there are three con-
tractors and a certain number of subcontractors. In general, the TF’s networks are
then characterized by a lower number of contractors and a larger number of sub-
contractors.
When we take into account the average networks dimension, the distinction be-
tween contractors and subcontractors becomes less important. In Table 5 we show
the networks’ distribution by dimension (number of partners) in the two frame-
works. While the mean number of partners is about five for both frameworks, in
the TF slightly less than 50% of the projects are carried out by networks with four
or less participants. This is due to the fact that an extremely high number of net-
works (91) have only three participants. On the other hand, in the SF the networks
with five participants are the ones with the highest share. Then, going from the
second to the third framework we can highlight a contraction in the dimension of
the network, with a polarization of projects within the three–participants network
structure.
In general, without taking into account the participants’ position in the net-
work, the most recent Framework Program is characterized by networks of a smaller
dimension. Moreover, when we look also at the type of participants, the networks
of the TF are not only smaller but they are also characterized by a larger amount
of subcontractors than by an increasing number of, probably pre-existing, one–to–
one relations. Therefore, it seems that this kind of evolution can hinder the process
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Table 6: Concentration in the participation
2nd Framework 3rd Framework Total
Single Participation 711 71.2 % 780 75.3 % 1184 69.6 %
(A) (40 % ) (47 %) 34.4 %
Repeated Participation 287 28.8 % 256 24.7 % 516 30.4 %
(B)
Total Number
of Institutions 998 1,036 1,700
(C) = (A) + (B)
Expanded 1,067 882 2,256
Participations (60 %) (53 %) (65.6 %)
(D)
Total Participations 1,778 1,662 3,440
(E) = (A) + (D)
Source: Elaboration EC Data.
of diffusion of new technologies (and of related knowledge bases and capabilities),
that is at the base of the European science and technology policy. On the other
hand the shrinking of the network dimension can be also due to organizational in-
efficiencies connected to the management of a large dimension network. So it can
be considered as a needed cost –i.e. less institutions involved means less diffusion
of new knowledge– to obtain the generation of new technologies –i.e. less part-
ners means easier management and then higher probability of succeeding in the
research.
To study the effectiveness of the EC diffusion policy we decided to analyze
the concentration in the participation. We assigned a name (A, B, C, etc.) to the
various participating institutions and we identified them in the different projects in
both frameworks. The result is shown in Table 6. An institution can be involved in
RTD projects only one time (single participation), or more times (repeated partici-
pation). For the latter type of organization it is then possible to calculate how many
times, included the first, it has taken part into a project (expanded participations).
The analysis of these variables enables us to compare the two frameworks and to
draw some conclusions on the real impact of the EC funding in terms of diffusion
policy.
First, the average number of participations for the institutions with repeated
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participation (D/B) is decreasing. From 3.72 participation in the SF to 3.45 in the
TF. In other words the institutions with only one participation obtained in the TF a
higher share of contracts (from 40% to 47%). Second, when we consider the two
frameworks together we can highlight a higher value for the average number of
participations (4.37). This is due to the presence of institutions that are both in the
SF and in the TF. Third, there are 334 institutions present at least one time in both
frameworks. This group of institutions is characterized by an average number of
participations equal to 5.41. Moreover, these 334 institutions, after the first partic-
ipation, are involved another 1474 times in a project. Considering that in the two
frameworks together there are 1740 participations that are repetitions, it follows
that the 334 institutions are responsible of 85% of the repetitions (1474 = 0.85 
1740). They represent only 19.6% of the population, but they account for 1808
contracts, that is to say 52.6% of the total contracts signed during the two frame-
works. Fourth, The 516 institutions with repeated participation in the two frame-
works together can be divided in two groups. The first group is formed by the 334
institutions with a mean participation of 5.41 and the second group is formed by the
182 institutions with an average number of participations equal to 1.46 (266/182,
where 266 = 1740 - 1474). Finally, the 1700 institutions present in both frame-
works can be characterized as follows:
 The ”singles”, formed by 1184 institutions that got only one contract;
 The ”networkers”, formed by 182 institutions that got more contracts, but
only in one framework;
 The ”hard hub”, constituted by 334 institutions that got more contracts in
both frameworks.
To conclude, we can highlight an effort of the Commission for enlarging the
population of institutions involved in RTD projects. In the TF there is, indeed, a
larger variety. There are more institutions with a single participation. Therefore
we can consider the increase in the number of single participants as a positive in-
dicator of the impact of the EC diffusion policy. However, it is extremely impor-
tant to stress the relevance of the hard hub. If 19% of the institutions succeed in
getting 52% of the contracts it means that more than a half of the EC funds are di-
rected to the same group of institutions. Assuming that these organizations have
an extremely high quality, then excluding every kind of bureaucratic inertia and all
types of possible industrial lobbying, this implies that the distribution of funds is
heavily shaped by the merit criterium and then strongly influenced by cumulative
and self reinforcement mechanisms 8. Therefore, considering both BE programs
8Institutions that are succesful in getting funds for their research have a higher probability of
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together, the type of involvement enables us to highlight that the Commission is
putting a stronger emphasis on the short-term, high performance objectives leav-
ing a secondary role to diffusion policy.
It seems that participants included in the hard hub, networkers and singles, may
have significant different behavior within the networks. We will try to provide ev-
idence on this differential behavior by estimating the theoretical model presented
above.
5 Empirical results
In this section we estimate the demand functions derived in section 2.
As a deflator we use a real effective exchange rate index against the ECU, since
all values are given in this currency unit. As the threat variable, T , we use the
average EC contribution for networks of the same size in the same framework.
We assume a loglinear relation for the demand functions derived in the previous
section. Total income for each partner of a network is not available, and therefore
we have to adopt the assumption that preferences are strongly separable and that
the budget constraint depends on the the total budget assigned to the project. As
the dependent variable we use total EC contribution.
Equation (6) for the Nash-Cournot case is then formulated as:
logCONTRIBUTION D i0 C i1 log INCOMEC(12)
i2 log SPILLC i3 log THREATC Ni
where CONTRIBUTION is the total contribution of the EEC to the network,
SPILL is the total contribution to the network minus the contribution for individ-
ual i, T HRE AT is the average EC contribution to networks of equal size and IN-
COME is total income approximated by the total cost of the project plus SPILL.
We add a random perturbation term Nt .
Equation (11) for the case of Lindahl equilibrium is formulated as:
logCONTRIBUTION D i0 C i1 logCOST(13)
Ci2 log SHAREC log THREATC Hi ;
producing exploitable research which improves their probability of joining other projects in the
future (see David, 1993, Dasgupta and David, 1994 and Geuna, 1995).
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where COST is the total cost of the project, SHARE is the individual cost share
(individual contribution received over total contribution), THREAT is the average
contribution to networks of similar size and Li is a random perturbation term.
In equation (12) the variables INCOME and SPILL are simultaneously deter-
mined in the theoretical model with the EC contribution, and therefore they are
correlated with the error term. Similarly in equation (13) the variable SHARE is
correlated with the error term. Consistent estimates can be obtained by applying
an instrumental–variable estimation procedure. As instruments we chose the total
cost of the project (COST) and the threat variable (THREAT).
In table 7 we show the results. The first column presents the pooled regres-
sion over both frameworks and types, while the rest of the columns lists separate
regressions for both frameworks and types of participants. We show first the re-
sults both for the Nash and Lindahl model, and afterwards we will conduct a test
to discriminate among these two models.
For the Nash-Cournot equilibrium models, the estimated elasticities are pos-
itive and significant in all the cases. This provides support for the joint–product
model. Both activities, public common knowledge and private appropriation of
knowledge, show elasticities which are less than unity showing that these are nor-
mal goods.
For the case of the Nash–Cournot equilibrium the estimated elasticities show
an increase in the spill–in effects from the second to the third framework. This
result is consistent with the dynamic features described in section 4. The spill–in
effects seem also less important for the hub and the networkers, which is consistent
with their role as network spanners. Single participants, on the other hand, receive
the highest proportion of spill-ins within the networks.
In the case of the Lindahl specification, the negative coefficient of the SHARE
variable is consistent with the Slutzky equation for the case of a Lindahl equilib-
rium. There is also a significant increase in the absolute value of this coefficient
from the second to the third framework for the hub and the networkers, and a de-
crease for the singles. This is consistent with the results obtained for the Nash equi-
librium.
It is interesting to discriminate between these two models, which provides evi-
dence on the cooperative behavior within the networks. We conduct a non–nested
J-test for discriminating between the models9 The methodology consists of two
new regressions, which are constructed as follows: First a regression is run on the
Lindahl model, and then the predicted values of this regression is added as a new
explanatory variable to the Nash model. If the estimated coefficient for this new
9See MacKinnon, White and Davidson (1983) on the methodology of this test.
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Table 7: Nash-Cournot and Lindahl coalition models. Dependent Variable: total
contribution of the EU
Pooleda Second Framework Third Framework
Regression Hard Hub Networkers Singles Hard Hub Networkers Singles
Nash equilibrium
Intercept 0.003b 0.77 1.23b 0.56b 0.76 0.50b -0.07b
(0.12) (0.30) (0.71) (0.30) (0.20) (0.39) (0.37)
Income 0.59 0.61 0.54 0.58 0.59 0.59 0.59
(0.01) (0.02) (0.04) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01)
Spill 0.23 0.17 0.14 0.28 0.28 0.41 0.32
(0.02) (0.04) (0.18) (0.03) (0.04) (0.06) (0.06)
Threat 0.17 0.16 0.23 0.10 0.08 -0.04b 0.09b
(0.02) (0.04) (0.16) (0.05) (0.04) (0.09) (0.07)
Lindahl equilibrium
Intercept -0.15b 1.06b 2.14b 1.07b 1.11 -0.35b -1.34
(0.22) (0.67) (1.35) (0.81) (0.40) (0.76) (0.59)
Cost 0.45 0.45 0.31 0.55 1.45 0.53 0.44
(0.02) (0.03) (0.10) (0.06) (0.04) (0.12) (0.07)
Share -0.41 -0.40 -0.27 -0.52 -0.44 -0.59 -0.40
(0.03) (0.05) (0.13) (0.08) (0.05) (0.16) (0.10)
Threat 0.54 0.46 0.53 0.34 0.45 0.46 0.63
(0.03) (0.06) (0.16) (0.11) (0.06) (0.17) (0.12)
All the coefficients are significant at a 5 % level unless otherwise noted.
aAll the data for both frameworks and type of participants pooled.
bNot significantly different from zero at a 5 % level.
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Table 8: J-Test for discriminating between Nash and Lindahl behavior
Hypothesis 1 Hypothesis 2
L t-ratio Conclusion N t-ratio Conclusion
Second Framework
Hard Hub -0.49 -2.3 Reject 1.60 53.0 Reject
Networkers -0.95 -1.7 Fail to reject 1.77 18.1 Reject
Singles -0.69 -3.3 Reject 1.39 27.4 Reject
Third Framework
Hard Hub -0.05 -0.3 Fail to reject 1.15 38.6 Reject
Networkers 0.42 0.6 Fail to reject 0.94 10.6 Reject
Singles 0.04 0.2 Fail to reject 1.23 39.1 Reject
variable, which we call L , turns out to be significantly different from zero, then
the Lindahl model is supported (Hypothesis 1). If it is not significantly different
from zero then there is evidence against the Lindahl model. The second regres-
sion consists of this procedure reversed, that is, a regression is run with the orig-
inal Lindahl model plus the predicted values of the Nash model, obtaining a new
coefficient N (Hypothesis 2). We conduct this test for the 6 models, that is for
the two frameworks and the three types of participants. The results are reported in
table 8.
Our data seem to support a non–cooperative behavior in the interaction of net-
workers, especially in the third framework. For that framework the Nash model
cannot be rejected while the Lindahl model is rejected in all instances.
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6 Concluding remarks
In this paper we have investigated the dynamics of network formation within the
Brite-Euram program. This is a program implemented by the European Union to
foster industry–university R & D research with the objective of improving the com-
petitiveness of European industry.
We unveiled some dynamic features for the role of the hub of the networks,
main contractors, and the behavior of followers. We found that a small group of
institutions account for most of the participations within the networks, but that go-
ing from the second to the third framework of projects, the presence of subcon-
tractors and single participants increases. Therefore the most reputed institutions
are receiving most of the funding, but at the same time an increasing number of
participants are receiving spill–ins from the hub.
This interpretation is reinforced by a testable model of coalition formation and
spill-ins of public knowledge within the coalitions. We model networks as coali-
tions formed with the objective of jointly producing private knowledge and com-
mon knowledge which is public within the networks. In this kind of model, we
find that institutions that account for most participations receive smaller spill-ins
than institutions that participate many times but only in one framework or institu-
tions that participate only once. Spill–ins also seem to increase from the second to
the third framework.
These results may have important policy implications related to the long–term
results pursued by EU funding, and the short–term results of increasing competi-
tiveness for European industries. The cohesion objectives in principle hinder short–
term results, but through an indirect way by powering the hub of the networks, in-
creased spill–ins are being generated to a larger number of institutions.
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Appendix: The BRITE–EURAM family of research
programs
The first BRITE-EURAM program was built on the experience and the achieve-
ments emerging from the separate BRITE (Basic Research in Industrial Technolo-
gies for Europe) and EURAM (European Research on Advanced Materials) pro-
grams. In particular, under BRITE (1985-1988) 215 shared-cost research projects
were developed. The European Commission (henceforth EC) allocated 180 mil-
lion ECUs (MECU) to that program. The most relevant aim of the program was
to develop the applications of new technologies and new materials in traditional
industrial sectors. During the same span of time under the EURAM (1986-1989)
program the EC approved 91 projects, for about 30 MECU. The program had as its
main goal to stimulate the development of research in new materials (CEC, 1992a:
p.65).
The BRITE-EURAM I (1989-1992) program (henceforth BE I) is then the ag-
gregation and extension of these two programs. It was approved by the Coun-
cil of Ministers on March, 1989. It was budgeted under the Second Framework
Program for about 500 MECU. The main aim of this 4-year program was to im-
prove the competitiveness of European manufacturing industry in the world mar-
ket. Moreover, the following strategic objectives were also indicated: (i) to fos-
ter trans-frontier collaboration in strategic industrial research, (ii) to support the
transfer of technology across Community frontiers and between sectors, particu-
larly those with many small and medium enterprises (SME), (iii) to underpin the
process of European cohesion (Commission, 1993: pp.9-16). Even if the program
was devoted to pre-competitive research it was characterized, more than the pre-
vious two, by market-oriented activity. The Program covered 5 R &D areas:
(1) Advanced Materials Technology,
(2) Design Methodology and Assurance,
(3) Application of Manufacturing Technologies,
(4) Technologies for Manufacturing Processes,
(5) Aeronautics.
To assist SMEs, the program included not only shared-cost research contracts,
but also concerted actions and feasibility awards 10. Emphasis on SMEs and mar-
ket orientation of research distinguished the BE I program from the previous two.
10Concerted Actions are projects to support the coordination of broad–based, pan–European col-
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On September, 1991, within the Third Framework Program, the Industrial and
Material Technology program (BRITE-EURAM II) was approved for the period
1991- 1994 by the Council of Ministers. The operating budget of the program was
approximately 670 MECU. This program resulted from the merging of the two pro-
grams BE I and Raw Materials and Recycling (1990-1992) 11. Following the pre-
vious program, the basis of BRITE-EURAM II (henceforth BE II) was the revi-
talization of European manufacturing industry. Its main aims were: (i) to increase
the competitiveness of European industry in the face of strong international chal-
lenges, particularly in strategic sectors of advanced technology; (ii) to strengthen
European economic and social cohesion consistent with the pursuit of scientific
and technical excellence; (iii) to increase implementation of advanced technolo-
gies by SMEs; (iv) to increase involvement of manufacturing SMEs in European
RTD thereby developing links with other enterprises (Commission, 1992b, pp.7-
11).
The program was characterized by a focus on advanced technology, the rele-
vance given to the process of European economic and social cohesion and by the
particular support for the SMEs’ participation 12. The program included three main
technical areas –i.e. areas of research– which were:
(1) Materials & Raw Materials:
(1.A) Raw Materials and Recycling,
(1.B) New and Improved Materials and Their Processing;
(2) Design & Manufacturing:
(2.A) Design,
(2.B) Manufacturing and Engineering;
(3) Aeronautics.
laborative research activities in promising new technologies with the benefit of real added value as
a result of cross–border collaboration. The Commission supports the coordination costs, but not
the research cost. Feasibility Award is a special type of contract, available to SMEs, that covers up
to 75 % of the costs of research undertaken within nine months (subject to a maximum of 30,000
ECUs) to establish the feasibility of a concept, process or material for a collaborative Brite–Euram
project.
11During the two years of life of the RAW program 69 shared–cost research projects for about
23 MECU were carried out.
12The Cooperative Research Action for Technology (CRAFT) is designed to provide enterprises,
especially SMEs not having their own research facilities, with the possibility to contract outside
research institutes to carry out research on their behalf (ibid: p.13).
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Industrial enterprises, universities, research centers and other institutions have
taken part into the program through five different schemes of support. They are:
(1) shared-cost collaborative research projects. In particular, about 90% of the
available Community research budget was ascribed to the two sub-categories In-
dustrial Research (80%) and Focused Fundamental Research (10%); (2) Concerted
Actions already implemented in BE I; (3) Accompanying Measures, among which,
with a particular importance, the previously mentioned Feasibility Awards; (4) Co-
operative Research Actions for Technology; and (5) Targeted Research Actions,
which imply that for specific subjects of common interest –e.g. environmentally
friendly technologies and flexible and clean manufacturing– industrial research projects
may be grouped together and be subject to special coordination to ensure synergy
between the separate projects. What is interesting to grasp from the previous de-
scription is the continuity between the two BRITE-EURAM programs. Indeed,
BE II can be seen as a further step in the process of definition of a European pro-
gram. Due also to the Maastricht Treaty and to the feed-back from the previous
program, BE II turned out to be a program with a clearer strategic orientation and
an improved and enlarged variety of schemes of support.
The new research and technological development program in the field of indus-
trial and materials technologies BRITE-EURAM III (1994-1998) (henceforth BE
III) was approved by the Council of Ministers on July 1994. The operating bud-
get of the program is about 1,700 MECU. The concern with the competitive posi-
tion of the European manufacturing industry is still at the hearth of the program.
In particular, competitiveness is seen as the most effective means of maintaining
and even increasing employment. Due to the latest economic recession (1990–93)
and due to the increased concern about pollution level, the program aims to stim-
ulate industry’s capacity to ”develop technology for human-centered production
system taking account of human factors and based on clean technologies” (Com-
mission, 1994a: p.7). Three specific objectives are identified. They are: (i) “in the
short term, priority should be assigned to research for the adaptation of existing
technologies, or for the development of new technologies ... particularly in sectors
where the level of technology is lower; SMEs in these sectors account for a large
proportion of European industry”; (ii) “in the medium term, research will focus
on industries which are already developing innovative technologies and strategies
allowing better use of human resources while endeavoring to reduce the adverse
environmental impact of production”; (iii) “in the long term, research will focus on
new technologies for the production and the design of products which allow new
industries or markets to be created in a context of sustainable growth” (ibid: p.8).
The program will include three main technical areas –i.e. areas of research– which
are:
(1) Production technologies for future industries;
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(2) Technologies for product innovation;
(3) Technologies for transport means.
While the first two, with different name and different sub-classes, are similar
to the first two areas of BE II, the third one has been broadened to include not only
aeronautics, but also other technologies for transportation. The program will be
implemented through the same schemes of support used in BE II. The only new
tool is the Pre-Normative Research Project. It is linked to the fulfillment of the
general goal of the Fourth Framework Program of supporting the other Community
policies through pre-normative research. Finally, the observation we made for the
evolution of BE II in comparison with BE I, can be also made for the new program
versus the previous one. What we want to underline here is the existence of an
evolution process which can be linked to the change of external economic and non-
economic factors. However, the various modifications are not modifying a group
of consolidated features of what we can call the BRITE-EURAM family.
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